

Message Text

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USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY

USCINCEUR PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 11 MBFR VIENNA 0497

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: INFORMAL SESSION WITH EASTERN REPS ON DECEMBER
10, 1974

REF: MBFR VIENNA 0496

FOLLOWING IS CONTINUATION OF REPORT OF INFORMAL
SESSION WITH EASTERN REPS ON DECEMBER 10. PARAGRAPHS
1 THROUGH 4 CONTAINING SUMMARY TRANSMITTED REFTEL.

5. POLISH REP, AS HOST, WELCOMED PARTICIPANTS. HE SAID
THAT, SINCE THIS WAS THE LAST UNOFFICIAL MEETING OF THE
FOURTH ROUND OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE MUTUAL REDUCTION
OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS, IT WAS FITTING TO SUM UP THE WORK
DONE DURING THE ROUND AND THE GENERAL STATE OF AFFAIRS

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IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. HIS WESTERN COLLEAGUES

MIGHT AGREE WITH THE CONCLUSION THAT, ALTHOUGH THE BUSINESSLIKE ATMOSPHERE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS HAD BEEN MAINTAINED AND ALTHOUGH THE NEGOTIATIONS HAD BEEN QUITE INTENSE DURING THIS ROUND, THEIR PRODUCTIVITY LEFT MUCH TO BE DESIRED. IN FACT, NO PROGRESS, RAPPROACHMENT, OR AGREEMENT ON SPECIFIC ISSUES HAD SO FAR BEEN ACHIEVED.

6. POLISH REP CONTINUED THAT THE SOCIALIST DELEGATES HAD DEMONSTRATED IN PRACTICE THEIR READINESS TO CONDUCT CONSTRUCTIVE NEGOTIATIONS AND ACHIEVE PRACTICAL RESULTS. SOCIALIST REPRESENTATIVES HAD BASED THEIR APPROACH ON THE FUNDAMENTAL EASTERN POSITION SET FORTH IN THE 8 NOVEMBER DRAFT, WHICH PROVIDED A GOOD BASIS FOR AN OVERALL SOLUTION OF THE QUESTION OF THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THE EASTERN DRAFT AGREEMENT PROVIDED FOR CLEAR AND DISTINCT OBLIGATIONS FOR ALL PARTICIPANTS AND FOR SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS OVER A THREE-YEAR PERIOD. IT CORRESPONDED IN FULL TO THE REQUIREMENT OF MUTUALITY AND UNDIMINISHED SECURITY AGREED AS BASIC PRINCIPLES IN THE PRELIMINARY TALKS. AND THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES WERE NOT ASKING THE WEST TO UNDERTAKE ANY OBLIGATIONS THEY WERE NOT READY TO UNDERTAKE THEMSELVES. THE EASTERN APPROACH WOULD ENABLE PARTICIPANTS TO MAKE SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS WITHOUT UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE TO ANY PARTICIPANT AND TO COMPLEMENT POLITICAL DETENTE BY CONCRETE MEASURES OF MILITARY DETENTE.

6. POLISH REP CONTINUED THAT, AS REGARDS POSITION OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES, IT WAS CLEAR THAT THEY WISHED TO CHANGE THE PRESENT CORRELATION OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE TO THE ADVANTAGE OF NATO AND GAIN UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE AT THE EXPENSE OF THE SOCIALIST STATES. SINCE TABLING THEIR ORIGINAL PAPER OF NOVEMBER 22, WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAD SHOWN NO READINESS TO SEARCH FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS. MORE THAN THAT, THEY HAD OPENLY DECLARED THAT THEIR GOAL WAS TO CHANGE THE PRESENT CORRELATION OF FORCES IN THE AREA TO THE ADVANTAGE OF NATO ALTHOUGH THEY ALSO ASSERTED THAT THIS WOULD BRING NO DAMAGE TO THE SECURITY OF THE SOCIALIST STATES. EASTERN REPS HAD POINTED OUT THAT THIS APPROACH VIOLATED THE AGREED PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY. EASTERN REPS HAD ALSO LONG AGO POINTED OUT THAT THE WESTERN DISPARITY ARGUMENT ON WHICH THIS POSITION

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WAS BASED WAS ARTIFICIAL AND UNSCIENTIFIC, BECAUSE IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO JUSTIFY A FORCE ANALYSIS THROUGH TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION ONLY GROUND FORCES AND ONLY MANPOWER AND THE NUMBER OF TANKS AT THAT.

7. POLISH REP SAID EASTERN REPS HAD REPEATEDLY STATED THAT THIS WESTERN POSITION WAS UNREALISTIC AND COULD NOT SERVE AS A BASIS FOR A SEARCH FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS. THEY HAD ASKED

WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES TO STOP THEIR ATTEMPTS TO TRY TO OBTAIN UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGE. THE EAST WAS NOT ATTEMPTION TO OBTAIN UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGE FOR ITSELF AND EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES EXPECTED WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES TO STOP THESE EFFORTS. NONETHELESS, THE WESTERN COUNTRIES CONTINUED TO ADHERE TO THEIR ORIGINAL POSITIONS. THEY DECLARED THAT NO REDUCTIONS WERE ACCEPTABLE UNLESS THEY WERE ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS. IN REALITY THEY DID NOT WANT MUTUAL REDUCTIONS, BUT RATHER UNILATERAL REDUCTION OF THE FORCES OF THE SOCIALIST STATES. THE WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND CANADA HAD FOR A SOLID YEAR REFUSED TO GIVE A PRECISE DECLARATION OF THEIR INTENTION TO PARTICIPATE IN REDUCTIONS. BEYOND THIS, THE WESTERN COUNTRIES HAD DEMONSTRATED NO READINESS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE POSITION OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES AND TO BRING THEIR OWN POSITIONS, WHICH DEPARTED FROM THE AGREED PRINCIPLES OF NEGOTIATIONS, INTO CONFORMITY WITH THESE PRINCIPLES.

8. POLISH REP SAID WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES CONTINUED TO REFUSE AIR FORCES AND NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS AND TO SPEAK ONLY OF MANPOWER. CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPLE OF MUTUALITY, THE WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND CANADA HAD EVADED TAKING CONCRETE OBLIGATIONS ON THEIR FORCES. INSTEAD, THEY HAD PUT FORWARD THE ARBITRARY PRE-CONDITION OF SUBSTANTIAL PRIOR REDUCTIONS OF SOVIET FORCES. MORE THAN THAT, THEIR PERSISTENT OPPOSITION TO NATIONAL CEILING REPRESENTED AN EFFORT TO KEEP OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF INCREASING THEIR ARMED FORCES EVEN AFTER REDUCTIONS HAD BEEN AGREED AND CARRIED OUT. MOREOVER, THIS POSITION WAS CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY AND DEMONSTRATED THAT WESTERN PARTICIPANTS WERE STILL AIMING AT UNILATERAL GAINS. ALL OF THIS HAD MADE PROGRESS IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS AND HAD BEEN CONFIRMED BY THE ACTUAL COURSE OF THE FOURTH ROUND.

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9. POLISH REP SAID THAT, IN THE COURSE OF THE FOURTH ROUND, THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAD MADE IMPORTANT PROPOSALS. THEY HAD PROPOSED AN INITIAL REDUCTION STEP AND A COMMITMENT BY DIRECT PARTICIPANTS NOT TO INCREASE THEIR FORCES DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE WOULD NOT GO INTO DETAILS OF THE EASTERN PROPOSALS NOW. HIS COLLEAGUES WOULD DO SO SUBSEQUENTLY IN THE PRESENT SESSION. HE ONLY WISHED TO STATE THAT THE PURPOSES AND OBJECTIVES OF THE EASTERN INITIAL REDUCTION STEP PROPOSAL HAD BEEN FULLY EXPLAINED. BUT WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAD NOT BEEN WILLING TO DISCUSS THIS PROPOSAL IN A CONSTRUCTIVE WAY. AS FAR AS THE SECOND EASTERN PROPOSAL OF A NO-INCREASE COMMITMENT WAS CONCERNED, EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES WERE AWAITING CONSIDERED WESTERN RESPONSE WHICH HAD BEEN PROMISED. THEY HOPED THIS RESPONSE WOULD BE MORE CONSTRUCTIVE THAN THEIR FIRST REACTION.

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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y

FROM US REP MBFR

10. POLISH REP SAID THAT EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES DID NOT WISH TO LEAVE UNNOTICED THE FIRST HASTY, SKEPTICAL AND NEGATIVE REACTION OF THE WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES. WHAT WAS THE CONCLUSION EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAD TO DRAW FROM SUCH NEGATIVE REACTIONS? CERTAINLY NOT THAT THE WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES WERE EXERTING THEMSELVES IN A SEARCH FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS. THE ESSENCE OF THE WESTERN REACTION WAS THAT THE ONLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION WAS THAT WHICH CONFORMED TO THE WESTERN APPROACH. THIS APPROACH WAS BASED ON A CONTINUING SEARCH FOR A UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE. THIS NEGATIVE APPROACH PUT THE EAST ON GUARD.

11. POLISH REP CONTINUED THAT, ON THE OTHER HAND, WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAD NOT PUT FORWARD IN THIS ROUND ANY PROPOSAL
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COMPARABLE IN IMPORTANCE TO THE SOCIALIST PROPOSAL. THEY HAD NOT INDICATED WILLINGNESS TO PUT FORWARD ANY PROPOSAL BASED ON COMPROMISE. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAD COMMENTED ON THE WESTERN DEFINITION AND DATA PROPOSALS AND ON AIR MANPOWER NON-INCREASE PROPOSAL. FURTHER COMMENTS ON THESE WOULD FOLLOW LATER. BUT HAVING SCRUTINIZED THE WESTERN AIR FORCE MANPOWER PROPOSAL, THE EAST DID NOT FIND IN IT THE ANNOUNCED MAJOR STEP TO MEET THE EASTERN POSITION. THE EASTERN CONCLUSION WAS THAT, IN THE FOURTH ROUND, THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD NOT MADE A GENUINE EFFORT TO REACH MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS. THIS ATTITUDE WAS THE CAUSE OF LACK OF THE PROGRESS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH HAD BEEN GOING ON FOR THE PAST YEAR. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES WISHED TO CALL ON WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES TO GIVE SERIOUS ATTENTION TO EASTERN PROPOSALS, WHICH HAD BEEN MOTIVATED BY THE DESIRE TO MOVE FORWARD.

12. US REP SAID HE WISHED TO COMMENT IN RESPONSE TO THE POLISH REP'S CHARACTERIZATION OF WESTERN MOVES IN THE PAST ROUND AND ON THE GENERAL WESTERN APPROACH. POLISH REP'S BASIC ASSERTION SEEMED TO BE THAT WEST HAD A CERTAIN APPROACH WHICH HAD BEEN ARBITRARILY CONCEIVED TO GIVE THE WEST UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGE AND THAT THE WESTERN REPS HAD MERELY ADHERED TO THAT POSITION AND HAD NOT CAREFULLY CONSIDERED EASTERN SUGGESTIONS. IN RESPONSE, HE WISHED FIRST TO STATE THAT HE DID NOT CONSIDER THIS A CONSTRUCTIVE WAY TO APPROACH WHAT THE WESTERN REPS WERE DOING IN THESE TALKS BECAUSE IT DID NOT EVIDENCE A BONA FIDE EFFORT TO UNDERSTAND WESTERN CONCERNS. THE WESTERN POSITION THROUGHOUT THE NEGOTIATIONS TO DATE HAD BEEN BASED ON THEIR VIEWS OF THE MILITARY SITUATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE. ALLIED REPS HAD GONE TO GREAT PAINS TO EXPLAIN THEIR VIEW OF THE MILITARY SITUATION AND HAD TAKEN THE UNILATERAL INITIATIVE TO GIVE THE EAST DATA WITH RESPECT TO THE MORE IMPORTANT FACTS OF THE SITUATION. TO HAVE A USEFUL AND INTELLIGENT DISCUSSION OF THE TWO BASIC PROPOSALS MADE IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS, PARTICIPANTS MUST DEAL WITH AND DISCUSS THESE BASIC FACTS. YET WESTERN REPS WERE CURRENTLY IN A POSITION WHERE THE EASTERN REPS NEITHER CONFIRMED NOR DENIED THE ACCURACY

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OF THIS BASIC DATA WHICH WEST HAD UNILATERALLY OFFERED. THE WESTERN POSITION WAS BASED ON THESE

FACTS. IT WAS NOT INTENDED TO GIVE EITHER SIDE UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE BUT RATHER TO BE USED TO PRODUCE AN OUTCOME WHICH BOTH SIDES HAD AGREED SHOULD BE THE OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, NAMELY, A MORE STABLE SITUATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

13. US REP SAID, TO TURN TO THE EAST'S APPROACH AND EAST'S MOVES OVER THE YEAR, THE EAST HAD BASICALLY ADHERED TO THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF ITS ORIGINAL POSITION. THE ONLY DIFFERENCE HAD BEEN THE TWO SMALL PROCEDURAL CHANGES THE EAST HAD PUT FORWARD AS PART OF ITS FIRST STEP PROPOSAL. IT WAS NOT NECESSARY TO REPEAT WHY THESE CHANGES WERE SMALL PROCEDURAL ONES AND WHY IT WAS A FACT THAT THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE EASTENPOSITION REMAINED UNCHANGED. BY CONTRAST, THE ALLIED REPS HAD RECENTLY ADVANCED A PROPOSAL WHICH DID REPRESENT A BASIC CHANGE IN THEIR UNDERLYING POSITION. THE ALLIES WERE NOW WILLING TO COVER AIR MANPOWER IN AGREEMENTS. THIS WAS A MOST SIGNIFICANT CHANGE FROM THEIR ORIGINAL POSITION. WHEN ONE SIDE MADE SUCH A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE AND THE OTHER SIDE FAILED TO RECOGNIZE IT AS SUCH, THIS WAS NOT HELPFUL FOR THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. IN SAYING THIS, HE OF COURSE DID NOT MEAN THAT THE EASTERN REPS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO SAY THAT THE WEST HAD NOT GONE FAR ENOUGH. BUT THE ONLY CONSTRUCTIVE WAY WAS TO RECOGNIZE CONSTRUCTIVE CHANGES WHEN THEY OCCURRED. FOR THIS REASON HE CONSIDERED THAT THE CONCLUSION IN THE POLISH REP'S STATEMENT THAT THE WEST HAD NOT MADE ANY MOVES IN THIS ROUND WAS INACCURATE. HE HOPED IT RESULTED ONLY FROM AN EXCESS OF RHETORIC AND DID NOT REFLECT THE EAST'S TRUE ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION.

14. CZECHOSLOVAK REP SAID POLSIH REP HAD ALREADY POINTED OUT IN HIS OPEING REMARKS THE MAJOR INITIATIVES THE EAST HAD TABLED IN THE FOURTH ROUND. HE HAD IN MIND THE INITIAL REDUCTION STEP PROPOSAL AS WELL AS THE NOVEMBER 26 PROPOSAL THAT DIRECT PARTICIPANTS
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SHOULD NOT INCREASE THEIR FORCES FOR THE DURATION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE EASTERN PROPOSAL FOR AN INITIAL REDUCTION STEP WAS MANIFESTLY A COMPROMISE

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USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY

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FROM US REP MBFR

PROPOSAL WORKED OUT WITH DUE REGARD FOR THE WESTERN POSITION. IT PROVIDED FOR REDUCTIONS IN 1975 AND THE CONTINUATION OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THE BASIS OF AGREED PRINCIPLES. IT MIGHT BE GIVEN THE FORM OF AN INDEPENDENT AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD IN NO WAY PREJUDICE THE POSITION OF PARTICIPANTS WITH REGARD TO FURTHER REDUCTIONS. HOWEVER, THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD SHOWN NO DESIRE TO APPROACH THIS PROPOSAL IN A CONSTRUCTIVE SPIRIT. THE SECOND EASTERN PROPOSAL WAS SIMPLE AND DIRECT. IT WAS TO PUT A BARRIER IN THE WAY OF CONTINUATION OF THE ARMS RACE WHILE STRENGTHENING THE CONFIDENCE OF PARTICIPANTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE, AND THUS CREATING FAVORABLE CONDITIONS FOR NEGOTIATING REDUCTIONS. BUT EVEN THIS CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSAL HAD MET WITH NOTHING BUT A SKEPTICAL REACTION FROM THE WEST. UNDER THESE

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CONDITIONS, ONE QUESTION AROSE. HOW WERE THE EASTERN REPS TO EVALUATE THESE REACTIONS FROM THE WESTERN REPS? THEY CERTAINLY COULD NOT BE EVALUATED AS PROOF OF AN EFFORT TO SEARCH FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS. EASTERN REPS WOULD HAVE MORE TO SAY ON WESTERN PROPOSALS SUBSEQUENTLY DURING THE SESSION, BUT PERHAPS IT WOULD BE BETTER TO HEAR WHETHER THE WEST HAD ANY FURTHER RESPONSE TO THE EASTERN NON-INCREASE PROPOSAL.

15. THE NETHERLANDS REP COMMENTED THAT THE CZECHOSLOVAK AND POLISH REPS HAD SPOKEN OF THE EASTERN PROPOSAL, THE INITIAL REDUCTION STEP PROPOSAL AND THE NOV 26 FREEZE PROPOSAL. WITH REGARD TO THE FIRST OF THESE, THE ALLIED REPS HAD GIVEN THEIR VIEWS TO THE EAST IN PREVIOUS SESSIONS. IT WAS NOT NECESSARY TO ELABORATE ON THEM FURTHER NOW. WITH REGARD TO THE PROPOSAL OF NOV 26, THE POLISH REP HAD JUST REMINDED ALLIED REPS THAT THEY HAD PROMISED A CONSIDERED REPLY. DRAWING ON TALKING POINTS APPROVED BY THE AD HOC GROUP, WHICH CONTAINED COUNCIL GUIDANCE ON THIS SUBJECT, THE NETHERLANDS REP CONTINUED THAT THE WESTERN REPS HAD BEEN AUTHORIZED TO TELL THE EAST THAT THE ALLIES WERE CAREFULLY STUDYING THE EASTERN PROPOSAL OF AN UNDERTAKING NOT TO INCREASE THE NUMERICAL STRENGTHS OF MANPOWER OF THE TWO SIDES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS FOR THE DURATION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE FOLLOWING THREE DIFFICULTIES HAD EMERGED THUS FAR AS ESSENTIAL REASONS WHY THE ALLIES WERE SKEPTICAL ABOUT THIS PROPOSAL AS PRESENTED BY THE WARSAW PACT.

16. NETHERLANDS REP SAID THAT, FIRST, ANY DISCUSSION OF A COMMITMENT EVEN FOR A LIMITED TIME NOT TO INCREASE MANPOWER IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS MUST BE BASED ON A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING AS TO THE TOTAL NUMBER OF ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL TO WHICH SUCH A COMMITMENT WOULD APPLY. THE ALLIES HAD ALREADY PROVIDED DATA ON THE TOTALS OF THEIR GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, AND HAD INVITED THE WARSAW PACT TO A GENERAL EXCHANGE OF DATA. HOWEVER, THE EAST HAD THUS FAR DECLINED THE INVITATION. WITHOUT
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DATA ON THE PRESENT LEVEL OF GROUND AND AIR FORCE PERSONNEL IN THE AREA, A NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT WOULD BE ILLUSORY. SECOND, THE WARSAW PACT PROPOSAL ENVISAGED AN INDIVIDUAL COMMITMENT BY EACH OF THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS NOT TO INCREASE THE PRESENT LEVEL OF ITS FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. SUCH A COMMITMENT, IF UNDERTAKEN, WOULD RESULT IN ESTABLISHING CEILINGS FOR THE

NATIONAL FORCES OF EACH PARTICIPANT IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. THE ALLIES, ON THE OTHER HAND, REQUIRED COLLECTIVE CEILINGS IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THEIR LIBERTY TO ARRANGE THEIR FORCES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR NEEDS. THIRD, ANY NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT MUST NOT DIVERT THE TWO SIDES FROM REDUCTIONS WHICH WOULD LEAD TO APPROXIMATE PARITY OF GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS IN THE FORM OF A COMMON CEILING ON GROUND FORCE MANPOWER. OTHERWISE, THE EXISTING DISPARITY OF FORCES STRONGLY FAVORING THE WARSAW PACT WOULD REMAIN.

17. NETHERLANDS REP CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT THE WEST WOULD BE INTERESTED IN THE EAST'S CONSIDERED REACTION TO THESE POINTS.

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USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY

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FROM US REP MBFR

18. KHLESTOV SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE A FEW COMMENTS ON POINTS RAISED BY THE NETHERLANDS REP. HE WOULD NOT REPEAT EASTERN ARGUMENTS WHY THE EAST

BELIEVED THE NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT WAS IMPORTANT AND A SUBSTANTIAL MOVE FOR THESE NEGOTIATIONS CREATING BETTER CONDITIONS TO SEEK REDUCTIONS. THE STATEMENT JUST MADE BY THE NETHERLANDS REP THAT THE ALLIES WERE CAREFULLY STUDYING THE EASTERN NON-INCREASE PROPOSAL WAS A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT. IT INDICATED RECOGNITION ON THE WESTERN SIDE THAT THE EASTERN PROPOSAL WAS A REASONABLE ONE. IF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES WERE SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING THIS PROPOSAL, IT WAS A WELCOM DEVELOPMENT.

19. KHLESTOV SAID THAT, AS TO SPECIFIC REMARKS BY THE NETHERLANDS REP, FIRST A FEW WORDS CONCERNING
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HIS STATEMENT THAT THE WEST MIGHT HAVE SOME DIFFICULTIES WITH REGARD TO THE PROPOSAL THAT NATIONAL CEILINGS WOULD BE ESTABLISHED BY THE EASTERN PROPOSAL AS THE EAST HAD IN FACT PROPOSED. THE EASTERN REPS HAD ALREADY ADVANCED SOME ARGUMENTS ON THIS POINT. BUT HE WISHED TO ADD THAT, OF COURSE, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL CEILINGS WOULD BE A NATURAL AND LOGICAL CONSEQUENCE OF AN OBLIGATION NOT TO INCREASE MANPOWER IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. BUT IT SHOULD BE KEPT IN MIND THAT NEGOTIATIONS WERE NOW UNDERWAY ON REDUCTIONS OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS. IN THIS CONTEXT, A SUDDEN INCREASE IN ARMED FORCES MANPOWER OF ANY PARTICIPATING COUNTRY WOULD RUN COUNTER TO THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. SECOND, ALL PARTICIPANTS ASSUMED, AND THE WESTERN REPS HAD SAID SO THEMSELVES, THAT THE AMOUNT OF TIME DURING WHICH THE PRESENT FORCE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD CONTINUE WOULD BE LIMITED. THE NON-INCREASE OBLIGATION WOULD BE IN EFFECT ONLY FOR THE DURATION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ON REDUCTIONS. LOOKING AT THE TIME PERIODS MENTIONED FROM TIME TO TIME DURING THESE TALKS, ALLIED REPS HAD MENTIONED FIVE YEARS. THE EASTERN REPS HAD MENTIONED A SHORTER PERIOD. IN ANY EVENT, ALL PARTICIPANTS EVIDENTLY ASSUMED THAT AN AGREEMENT ON REDUCTIONS WOULD BE REACHED WITHIN A FINITE PERIOD. IT MIGHT EVEN BE THAT NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE COMPLETED IN A SHORTER TIME THAN THE PERIODS WHICH HAD BEEN MENTIONED.

20. KHLESTOV CONTINUED THAT, THEREFORE, A NON-INCREASE OBLIGATION WOULD BE IN EFFECT ONLY DURING A LIMITED PERIOD OF TIME, AFTER WHICH IT WOULD BE REPLACED BY A REDUCTION AGREEMENT ITSELF. THEREFORE, WHEN ALLIED REPS SAID THEY HAD TO HAVE THE LIBERTY TO ARRANGE THEIR FORCES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR OWN NEEDS, THIS MUST HAVE REFERRED TO ARRANGEMENTS TAKING PLACE DURING THE

NEXT FEW YEARS. HE MIGHT BE MISTAKEN, BUT HE IMAGINED THAT HIS WESTERN COLLEAGUES WERE REFERRING TO THE INTEGRATION PROCESS IN WESTERN EUROPE. BUT IT WAS APPARENT THAT THERE WOULD BE NO INTEGRATION PROCESS OF THIS KIND WHICH WOULD AFFECT THE POINT UNDER CONSIDERATION AND WOULD TAKE PLACE IN THE NEAR FUTURE. HE MIGHT NOT BE RIGHT IN SAYING THIS, BUT
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WHAT WAS INVOLVED WAS A NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT VALID ONLY FOR A LIMITED PERIOD OF TIME DURING WHICH NATIONAL CEILINGS WOULD BE MAINTAINED. BUT WAS THIS A HARDSHIP? WESTERN REPS HAD PERSISTENTLY EMPHASIZED DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND WESTERN LEADERS HAD SAID IN THE PAST, THAT THE WEST EUROPEANS WERE NOT PLANNING TO INCREASE THEIR MANPOWER FORCES IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. HE WOULD NOT CITE SPECIFIC DOCUMENTS OR STATEMENTS OF WESTERN POLITICAL OR MILITARY LEADERS ON THIS POINT, BUT THERE WERE MANY SUCH STATEMENTS. HIS PERSONAL POINT OF VIEW WAS THAT IT WOULD BE HARDLY POLITICALLY EXPEDIENT IF WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES INCREASED THEIR FORCES IN THE AREA ESPECIALLY WHILE NEGOTIATIONS WERE UNDERWAY.

21. KHLESTOV CONTINUED THAT ALL OF THESE POINTS INDICATED THAT THERE WAS NO PRACTICAL NEED FOR WEST EUROPEANS TO INCREASE THEIR FORCES IN THE AREA DURING THE DURATION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. HENCE, IT SHOULD NOT BE DIFFICULT FOR THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS TO AGREE TO THE EASTERN NON-INCREASE PROPOSAL WHICH WOULD MERELY FORMALIZE THE REAL STATE OF AFFAIRS. THEREFORE, IT SEEMED TO THE EASTERN REPS THAT THERE WERE NO PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES IN THE WAY OF ACCEPTING NATIONAL CEILINGS, AND POLITICALLY THIS WOULD BE A USEFUL STEP.

22. KHLESTOV SAID THAT, AS REGARDS THE THIRD POINT MADE BY THE NETHERLANDS REP, THAT A NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT SHOULD NOT DIVERT PARTICIPANTS FROM REDUCTIONS, THIS WAS A RATHER ARTIFICIAL ARGUMENT. THE COMMITMENT THAT THE EAST WAS PROPOSING PROVIDED FOR NON-INCREASE OF FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS WHICH WOULD BE EFFECTIVE UNTIL THE REDUCTION AGREEMENT WAS CONCLUDED. ADMITTEDLY, A NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT WAS NOT A REDUCTION AGREEMENT. BUT IT WOULD NOT DIVERT FROM REDUCTIONS. IT WAS PART AND PARCEL OF THE REDUCTION PROCESS. WESTERN REPS WOULD RECALL THE REFERENCE HE HAD EARLIER MADE TO A CAR. BEFORE A CAR COULD GO INTO REVERSE, IT HAD TO BE STOPPED FIRST. MOREOVER, HE WISHED TO
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EMPHASIZE THAT IN WORKING OUT THE TEXT OF A
SPECIFIC AGREEMENT ON A NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT,
THIS TEXT COULD PROVIDE THAT THE COMMITMENT WOULD
NOT PREJUDICE THE POSITIONS OF THE PARTICIPANTS ON REDUCTIONS
OR AS TO HOW REDUCTIONS WERE TO BE CARRIED OUT. A PROVISION

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S E C R E T SECTION 5 OF 11 MBFR VIENNA 0497

FROM US REP MBFR

MIGHT BE INCLUDED IN THE TEXT THAT A COMMITMENT
DID NOT PREJUDICE FURTHER REDUCTION STEPS.
DIFFERENT VIEWPOINTS ON THIS ISSUE WERE POSSIBLE,
BUT THERE WAS A LARGE INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE
ON NEGOTIATIONS WHICH COULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT
IN THIS CONNECTION.

23. KHLESTOV SAID, WITH REGARD TO THE FIRST POINT RAISED BY THE NETHERLANDS REP, WHEN LATTER HAD SAID THAT THE LEVELS OF FORCES SHOULD BE EXPRESSED IN SPECIFIC FIGURES, IT WAS THE EASTERN UNDERSTANDING THAT A JOINT DECLARATION OR STATEMENT WOULD REINFORCE AND DOCUMENT THE POLITICAL WILL OF THE PARTICIPANTS THAT THEY WOULD NOT INCREASE THE NUMERICAL POWER OF THEIR FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA. THIS WOULD NOT BE A STRICTLY FORMAL AGREEMENT BUT SOMETHING SECRET

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SEMI-FORMAL, A GENERAL DECLARATION MADE BY THE STATES PARTICIPATING IN THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS. IT SEEMED TO THE EASTERN REPS THAT SUCH A JOINT STATEMENT, EVEN WITHOUT DATA, WOULD BE OF POSITIVE VALUE. THIS WAS BECAUSE THE EASTERN REPS ASSUMED THAT PARTICIPANTS DID HAVE SOME IMPRESSION OR KNOWLEDGE OF THE FORCE FIGURES IN THE AREA. HE WISHED TO RECALL IN THIS CONTEXT THE ASSERTION OF THE WESTERN REPS THAT, IN THE COURSE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS, A CHANGE HAD TAKEN PLACE IN THE TOTAL STRENGTH OF EACH SIDE AND THAT THERE HAD BEEN AN INCREASE OF APPROXIMATELY EQUAL DIMENSIONS. THIS STATEMENT INDICATED THAT THE WEST DID POSSESS FIGURES OF THIS KIND AND WERE IN A POSITION TO OBTAIN THEM. MOREOVER, THE PROPOSED JOINT STATEMENT WOULD EMBODY A STATEMENT OF THE DETERMINATION OF EACH DIRECT PARTICIPANT NOT TO INCREASE ITS FORCES. EACH PARTICIPANT KNEW EXACTLY HOW MUCH FORCES HE POSSESSED. THEREFORE, PARTICIPANTS COULD RELY ON THE GOODWILL OF EACH INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPANT THAT HE WOULD HONOR THIS OBLIGATION. THIS WAS MORE SO SINCE THIS OBLIGATION WOULD BE IN EFFECT DURING A TIME WHEN NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE CONTINUING AND EACH PARTICIPANT HAD AN OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVE IN VIENNA. THEREFORE, THE EASTERN REPS CONSIDERED THEY COULD FEEL SURE THAT SUCH A STATEMENT WOULD BE HONORED BY EACH SIGNATORY OF IT. THIS IS WHY SUCH A JOINT STATEMENT COULD BE ACCEPTABLE. THEREFORE, EASTERN REPS BELIEVED THAT THE DIFFICULTY THE NETHERLANDS REP HAD JUST REFERRED TO WERE HARDLY JUSTIFIABLE.

24. US REP ASKED WHETHER HE UNDERSTOOD CORRECTLY THAT THE EASTERN PROPOSAL WOULD INVOLVE NATIONAL CEILINGS AND THAT KHLESTOV WAS ARGUING THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE A BURDEN BECAUSE THE PERIOD OF DURATION OF THE COMMITMENT WOULD BE LIMITED. DID THE EAST ENVISAGE NATIONAL CEILINGS IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT? KHLESTOV REPLIED

"YES." UK REP SAID THAT KHLESTOV HAD JUST SAID THAT NATIONAL CEILINGS MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE SINCE THEY WOULD BE IN FORCE FOR ONLY A LIMITED TIME WHILE NEGOTIATIONS WERE GOING ON.

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DID THIS STATEMENT MEAN THAT THE EAST CONSIDERED THAT NATIONAL CEILINGS WOULD BE VALID ONLY FOR THIS LIMITED PERIOD AND WOULD BE OVERTAKEN BY AN OVERALL CEILING VALID FOR THE REDUCTION PERIOD AFTER A REDUCTION AGREEMENT?

25. KHLESTOV REPLIED THAT, IN THE PRESENT SITUATION, THE EAST AND WEST HAD DIFFERENT POSITIONS ON REDUCTIONS. THIS INCLUDED THE QUESTION OF NATIONAL CEILINGS. IT WAS NATURAL THAT THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS ASSUMED THAT A NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT WOULD BE EFFECTIVE ONLY FOR A LIMITED PERIOD OF TIME. BUT DURING THE PERIOD WHEN SUCH A NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT WAS IN EFFECT, PARTICIPANTS WOULD CONTINUE THEIR NEGOTIATIONS. NATURALLY, EASTERN REPS ASSUMED THAT THEIR POSITION ON REDUCTIONS WOULD BE REFLECTED IN A FINAL REDUCTIONS AGREEMENT. BUT IT ALSO SEEMED TO HIM THAT THE FINAL SHAPE OF THE AGREEMENT WOULD BE ACHIEVED THROUGH MUTUAL EFFORTS. IT WAS DIFFICULT TO SEE WHAT THAT SHAPE MIGHT BE IN THE LONG RUN. HOWEVER, TO BE FRANK, THIS STATEMENT SHOULD NOT BE INTERPRETED TO MEAN THAT BECAUSE A FREEZE PROPOSAL WOULD BE OF LIMITED DURATION, THE EAST WOULD FOREGO ITS POSITION ON REDUCTIONS. THE SHAPE OF THE FINAL AGREEMENT REMAINED TO BE SEEN. BUT THE MOST IMPORTANT THING NOW WAS TO FIND A PRECISE LANGUAGE WHICH WOULD INDICATE THAT NOTHING IN THE NON-INCREASE AGREEMENT COULD BE INTERPRETED TO MEAN THAT THE EAST WAS ABANDONING ITS POSITION. FOR EXAMPLE, THE EASTERN REPS WERE SPEAKING OF ONLY LIMITING THE INCREASE OF MANPOWER ALONE. THIS WAS NOT THE BASIC EASTERN POSITION. SO NATURALLY THE EAST WOULD ALSO BE INTERESTED IN FINDING ASSURANCE THAT SUCH A NON-INCREASE PROPOSAL WOULD NOT UNDERMINE ITS OWN POSITION OF WHAT THE TERMS OF A REDUCTION PROPOSAL SHOULD BE.

26. UK REP SAID KHLESTOV HAD CLAIMED THAT A NON-INCREASE PROPOSAL WHICH INCLUDED NATIONAL CEILINGS WOULD CREATE NO PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES. THIS STATEMENT WAS NOT CORRECT. DRAWING ON TALKING POINTS APPROVED BY THE AD HOC GROUP, UK REP CONTINUED

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THAT EACH PARTICIPANT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WAS A MEMBER OF ONE OF THE TWO MILITARY ALLIANCES OPERATING IN EUROPE. THE EXISTENCE OF THESE TWO ALLIANCES WAS A BASIC REALITY OF THE PRESENT SITUATION. EACH OF THE PARTICIPANTS ON THE WESTERN SIDE TOOK DECISIONS CONCERNING DEFENSE IN CLOSE COOPERATION WITH ITS ALLIES. THERE WAS INEVITABLY A CLOSE DEGREE OF INTERDEPENDENCE. THE WESTERN COUNTRIES

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FROM US REP MBFR

COUNTRIES WERE UNWILLING TO MAKE AGREEMENTS WHICH COULD JUSTIFY THE INTERFERENCE OF ONE SIDE IN THE INTERNAL DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS OF THE OTHER. FOR THE NATO COUNTRIES, THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE BURDEN OF DEFENSE WAS AN INTERNAL MATTER. SUB-CEILINGS WOULD BE INCONSISTENT WITH CERTAIN FORMS OF DEFENSE SPECIALIZATION BETWEEN COUNTRIES WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. WESTERN REPS HAD MADE CLEAR FROM THE

OUTSET OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS THAT THEY WERE NOT PREPARED TO CONSIDER ANY LIMITATIONS OF A TYPE WHICH WOULD INTERFERE WITH EXISTING WESTERN DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS OR PREJUDICE THE FUTURE ORGANIZATION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN DEFENSE.

27. UK REP SAID THAT THE FACT THAT THE PROPOSED FREEZE WOULD BE FOR A LIMITED PERIOD EITHER DEPENDENT ON THE DURATION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS OR MORE PRECISELY SPECIFIED WOULD NOT AFFECT THIS. THE WEST WOULD STILL HAVE NEED
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TO ORGANIZE ITS OWN DEFENSE IN THE PERIOD BETWEEN NOW AND THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF A REDUCTIONS AGREEMENT. THIS NEED WOULD APPLY FOR THE PERIOD BETWEEN NOW AND THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF A REDUCTIONS AGREEMENT. THIS NEED WOULD APPLY FOR THE PERIOD OF NEGOTIATION, JUST AS IT WOULD APPLY AFTER REDUCTIONS HAD BEEN AGREED ON.

28. POLISH REP ASKED FOR A REPEAT OF THIS STATEMENT. UK REP SAID THAT THE NEED FOR THE WEST AND THE MEMBERS OF NATO TO ORGANIZE THEIR DEFENSE ARRANGEMENT WITHIN THE ALLIANCE APPLIED BOTH TO THE PERIOD OF A POSSIBLE FREEZE AND TO THE PERIOD AFTER A REDUCTION AGREEMENT WAS IN FORCE. THEREFORE, IT WAS NOT THE CASE THAT AS KHLESTOV HAD ARGUED THAT IT WOULD BE SIMPLE AND EASY FOR THE WESTERN COUNTRIES TO ACCEPT NATIONAL CEILINGS IN A FREEZE. IT WAS AS DIFFICULT TO ACCEPT SUCH LIMITATIONS NOW AS IT WOULD BE FOR A PERIOD IN WHICH A REDUCTION AGREEMENT WAS IN FORCE.

29. UK REP SAID HE WISHED TO ADD ONE WORD ON THE DATA POINT TO WHICH KHLESTOV RESPONDING TO THE ALLIED FIRST POINT ON THE FREEZE. KHLESTOV HAD SAID THE FREEZE PROPOSAL WOULD CREATE A POSITIVE ATMOSPHERE WHICH WOULD ALLOW PARTICIPANTS TO GO FORWARD ON REDUCTIONS. IT WAS DIFFICULT FOR THE ALLIED REPS TO SEE HOW, IN THE ABSENCE OF AGREED DATA ON THE FORCES TO BE FROZEN, THIS COULD BE SO. THE FACT THAT THE WEST HAD GIVEN THE EAST SOME FIGURES AND THE FACT THAT THE EAST HAD IMPLIED THAT THESE FIGURES WERE WRONG AND WERE NOW UNWILLING TO CONFIRM OR DENY THEIR ACCURACY MEANT THAT THE BASIS ON WHICH THE WESTERN REPS COULD, WITH ANY CONFIDENCE, ACCEPT THE IDEA OF A FREEZE DID NOT EXIST. KHLESTOV HAD SUGGESTED THAT EVERY PARTICIPANT WOULD KNOW HOW MANY FORCES ONE HAD AND COULD RELY ON THE GOODWILL OF THE PARTICIPANTS TO HONOR THE FREEZE. BUT IF THE EASTERN REPS KNOW THE FORCES WHICH CURRENTLY EXIST ON THEIR SIDE AND WERE WILLING TO EXERCISE GOODWILL IN FREEZING THESE FORCES, WHY WAS IT THAT THE EAST COULD NOT TELL THE WEST WHAT

THOSE FIGURES WERE SO THAT THEY COULD BE DISCUSSED
AND PARTICIPANTS COULD FIND A REAL BASIS FOR GOODWILL?

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IT SEEMED TO THE ALLIED REPS THAT WITHOUT SUCH A
BASIS FOR GOODWILL, THE KIND OF FREEZE THE EAST WAS
SUGGESTING COULD NOT CREATE THE BASIS OF CONFIDENCE
WHICH COULD ALLOW PARTICIPANTS TO GO FORWARD
WITH NEGOTIATIONS IN GOOD FAITH.

30. UK REP SAID HE WOULD LIKE NOW TO SAY A WORD
ABOUT THE MAJOR PROPOSAL THE ALLIED REPS HAD MADE
DURING THIS ROUND. THIS WAS THE PROPOSAL TO WHICH
THE US REP HAD REFERRED FOR A NO-INCREASE COMMITMENT
ON AIR FORCE MANPOWER. AS THE US REP HAD ALREADY
POINTED OUT, THIS HAD BEEN A MAJOR MOVE ON THE PART
OF THE ALLIES. WHEN THE EASTERN REPS HAD COMMENTED
ON IT DURING THE LAST SESSION, THEY HAD SAID AMONG
OTHER THINGS, THAT PARTICIPANTS IN THE PREPARATORY
TALKS HAD AGREED THAT ALL ARMED FORCES IN THE AREA
EXCEPT THE NAVY WOULD BE COVERED BY REDUCTIONS. THIS
WAS NOT THE WESTERN SIDE'S UNDERSTANDING. NO AGREE-
MENT HAD BEEN EITHER REACHED OR SOUGHT BY EITHER
SIDE DURING THE PREPARATORY TALKS ON THE ISSUE OF
WHAT TYPE OF FORCES WOULD BE REDUCED. THIS WAS A
SUBSTANTIVE QUESTION, AND, BY GENERAL AGREEMENT,
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES HAD BEEN RESERVED FOR THE NEGOTIA-
TIONS.

31. UK REP CONTINUED THAT THE SECOND POINT THE
EAST HAD MADE AT THE LAST SESSION REGARDING THE
WESTERN NO-INCREASE PROPOSAL WAS THAT THE EAST
CONSIDERED THAT AIR FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED ALONG
WITH GROUND FORCES. WESTERN REPS HAD SHOWN WHY IT
WOULD NOT CONTRIBUTE TO THE GOALS OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS
TO REDUCE AIR FORCES. THE BASIC REASON WAS THAT AIR

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FROM US REP MBFR

FORCES, ONCE WITHDRAWN, COULD BE REINTRODUCED INTO THE AREA MORE RAPIDLY THAN GROUND FORCES. THE GOALS OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS WERE TO ENHANCE STABILITY AND STRENGTHEN PEACE AND SECURITY. THE MAIN DESTABILIZING FACTOR IN THE PRESENT SITUATION WAS THE DISPARITY IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AND TANKS. TO ACHIEVE THESE GOALS, THESE DISPARITIES SHOULD BE ELIMINATED OR REDUCED. THERE WAS NO SIGNIFICANT DISPARITY IN AIR FORCE MANPOWER. AS ALLIED REPS HAD TOLD THE EAST, THE AGGREGATE AIR MANPOWER TOTALS ON BOTH SIDES WERE NEARLY EQUAL, ALTHOUGH WITH A SLIGHT WARSAW PACT SUPERIORITY. BECAUSE THE AIR MANPOWER TOTALS WERE NEARLY EQUAL, ADDING AIR MANPOWER TO GROUND FORCE MANPOWER WOULD NOT SERVE TO OFFSET THE WARSAW PACT ADVANTAGE IN GROUND MANPOWER. THUS, IT REMAINED NECESSARY TO FOCUS ON THE ELIMINATION OF THE GROUND
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MANPOWER DISPARITY.

32. UK REP SAID THAT, NEVERTHELESS, THE WEST WAS WILLING TO MEET THE EAST'S INTERESTS REGARDING AIR FORCES TO A REASONABLE EXTENT. TO DO SO, THE ALLIES HAD PROPOSED A MUTUAL NO-INCREASE COMMITMENT ON AIR MANPOWER IN CONNECTION WITH A PHASE I REDUCTION AGREEMENT. THE EFFECT OF THIS PROPOSAL WAS TO BRING

ALL ARMED FORCES MANPOWER, EXCEPT THE NAVY, OF ALL THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE AREA WITHIN THE SCOPE OF A FIRST AGREEMENT. THIS INCLUDED ALL PERSONNEL IN UNITS EQUIPPED WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS, SINCE SUCH UNITS WERE EITHER IN GROUND FORCES OR AIR FORCES. WITH THE ADDITION OF THE NO-INCREASE COMMITMENTS, THE WEST HAD SUGGESTED IN ITS REDUCTION PROPOSALS, THE ALLIES NOW HAD GIVEN THE EAST A COMPLETE FRAMEWORK FOR NEGOTIATING ON SUBSTANTIAL US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS IN A FIRST PHASE. PARTICIPANTS COULD NEGOTIATE ON SUCH REDUCTIONS, KNOWING THAT ALL ARMED FORCE MANPOWER OF ALL THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE AREA WOULD BE COVERED IN SOME MANNER. THE ALLIES CONSIDERED THIS A SATISFACTORY WAY OF DEALING WITH AIR FORCES IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTINUED TO HOPE THAT THE EAST WOULD AGREE.

33. KHESTOV SAID HE WISHED TO ASK A QUESTION ABOUT UK REP'S REMARKS ON NATIONAL CEILINGS. LATTER HAD REFERRED TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT NATIONAL CEILINGS WOULD CONSTITUTE AN IMPEDIMENT TO SPECIALIZATION AMONG SOME NATO MEMBERS. WHAT WAS SPECIALIZATION IN THIS CONTEXT? UK REP SAID HE COULD NOT GIVE ANY SPECIFICS ON THIS POINT. NATO COUNTRIES WISHED TO BE FREE TO DECIDE THAT SPECIFIC TASKS COULD BE ASSIGNED TO ONE MEMBER OR ANOTHER WITHOUT INTERFERENCE FROM THIS TYPE OF AGREEMENT. KHESTOV SAID THAT SPECIALIZATION AS US REP HAD DEFINED IT WAS EVIDENTLY NOT AN ISSUE, BUT RATHER THE RIGHT TO INCREASE FORCES.

34. SMIRNOVSKY SAID UK REP'S COMMENT HAD BEEN UNCLEAR. LATTER HAD SAID THAT EACH NATO MEMBER STATE HAS A CERTAIN TOTAL OF FORCES AT THE MOMENT. WHATEVER THE INTEGRATION PROCESS WAS, WHY WAS IT DIFFICULT FOR THEM TO MAINTAIN THE SAME NUMERICAL
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LEVEL DURING THE PERIOD OF NEGOTIATIONS. WERE INDIVIDUAL NATO STATES GOING TO INCREASE THEIR FORCES? UK REP SAID A JURIDICAL FREEZE WAS QUITE DIFFERENT FROM HAVING THE FREEDOM TO INCREASE, EVEN IF THEY DID NOT ACTUALLY DO SO. SMIRNOVSKY SAID THAT EAST WAS NOT ASKING FOR NEW LEVELS; IN PRACTICE PARTICIPANTS HAD CEILINGS NOW. UK REP SAID ONE VERY STRAIGHTFORWARD OPTION HAD TO BE PRESERVED. TRANSFERRING FUNCTIONS AMONG MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE MIGHT RESULT IN INCREASES. ONE PARTICIPANT MIGHT TAKE OVER ONE OR MORE FUNCTION. KHESTOV SAID THAT THIS PROCESS WOULD NOT NECESSARILY INVOLVE ANY INCREASE. NETHERLANDS REP SAID THAT INCREASES OF INDIVIDUAL FORCES MIGHT NOT BE EXCLUDED UNDER SPECIALIZATION. IF, FOR INSTANCE;, BELGIUM AND NETHERLANDS AGREED TO SPECIALIZATION, IN SOME WAY THE RESULT MIGHT BE AN INCREASE IN THE TOTAL FORCES OF ONE OR OTHER OF THEM IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. THIS WAS A WHOLLY

PRACTICAL CONSIDERATION. SMIRNOVSKY SAID FOR MANY YEARS NOW NATO MEMBERS HAD HAD THEIR OWN FORCES AND DEVELOPED THEM WITHOUT OUTSIDE COMMITMENTS. WHY WAS IT SO MUCH OF AN EFFORT TO ASK THAT THEY ACCEPT THEIR OWN PRESENT FORCE AS A BASE LINE FOR THE DURATION OF THE NEGOTIATION? UK REP SAID THIS WAS BECAUSE THE ORGANIZATION OF DEFENSE WAS NOT A STATIC MATTER, BUT DYNAMIC AND ALWAYS UNDER REVIEW. THE ALLIES NEEDED FREEDOM TO ORGANIZE THEIR FORCES AS THEY SAW FIT. SMIRNOVSKY SAID THIS POSITION WAS INCONSISTENT. ALLIED REPS HAD SUGGESTED A CERTAIN REDUCTION PROPOSAL FOR THE FIRST PHASE WHICH WOULD HAVE INTERFERED WITH SOVIET CAPACITY TO INTEGRATE AND COORDINATE. WARSAW PACT MEMBERS WERE IN THE SAME POSITION AS NATO IN THIS REGARD. THEY WERE WILLING TO ACCEPT THIS LIMITATION FOR THE PURPOSE OF HAVING A FREEZE. THE EAST TOO HAD BURDEN SHARING, COORDINATION, AND SPECIALIZATION NEEDS. MOREOVER, THE WESTERN PROPOSALS THEMSELVES SOUGHT TO IMPOSE NATIONAL CEILINGS.

35. KHESTOV SAID THIS WAS SO. WESTERN PROPOSALS SOUGHT TO IMPOSE NATIONAL CEILINGS FOR THE SOVIET AND AMERICAN FORCES. ALLIES WERE WILLING TO ACCEPT AND EVEN TO PROPOSE CEILINGS FOR THE FORCES OF SOME PARTICIPANTS, BUT NOT FOR OTHERS. UK REP POINTED OUT THAT THE US AND USSR WOULD UNDERTAKE OBLIGATION NOT TO INTRODUCE FURTHER FORCES INTO THE AREA, BUT THAT THIS WAS NOT THE SAME AS A NATIONAL CEILING, SINCE ALL OF THEIR FORCES WOULD NOT BE INVOLVED. KHESTOV AND STRULAK
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FROM US REP MBFR

ASKED WHY IN THIS CASE UK FOR ITS PART WAS NOT WILLING TO

ACCEPT NATIONAL

CEILINGS; AFTER ALL, ALL OF ITS FORCES WERE NOT IN THE AREA AND WOULD NOT BE AFFECTED. UK REP SAID THIS WAS THE CASE, BUT UK WAS A MEMBER OF

THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND DID NOT WISH TO BE TREATED DIFFERENTLY FROM

OTHER MEMBERS KHLESTOV SAID AS HE SAW IT, THEN, ONLY THE BELGIANS, NETHERLANDS, AND FRG ON THE WESTERN SIDE WOULD RECEIVE NATIONAL CEILINGS IN THE SENSE UK WAS MENTIONING.

36. SMIRNOVSKY SAID UK REP HAD EXPLAINED ALLIED DIFFICULTIES IN ACCEPTING NATIONAL CEILINGS. ALLIED REPS WERE SAYING THAT NATIONAL CEILINGS WOULD INTERFERE WITH THE RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES WITHIN THEIR ALLIANCE AND LIMIT INTERGRATION AND BURDEN-SHARING WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. BUT THE SAME ALLIED REPS DID
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HESITATE TO PROPOSE A SUBSTANTIAL SOVIET REDUCTION IN THE FIRST PHASE, WHICH WOULD RESULT IN A NATIONAL CEILING OF THE SOVIET FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA, TOTALLY IGNORING ASPECTS OF BURDEN SHARING AND COOPERATION AS THEY EFFECTED THE WARSAW PACT. WAS THIS A FAIR APPROACH? DID IT DEMONSTRATE THE DESIRE TO FIND MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS? UK REP SAID THE POSITION OF THE SUPERPOWERS WAS DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF OTHER PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. ALLIES HAD PROPOSED THE SAME LIMITATIONS FOR BOTH THE U.S. AND USSR. ONCE THEY HAD WITHDRAWN FORCES THEY WOULD UNDERTAKE AN OBLIGATION NOT TO INTRODUCE ADDITIONAL FORCES INTO THE AREA. THIS WAS NOT THE SAME AS A NATIONAL CEILING. SMIRNOVSKY SAID THESE REMARKS AGAIN SHOWED WHY EASTERN REPS CONSIDERED THIS WESTERN APPROACH WHOLLY CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPLES OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY. EASTERN REPS COULD LECTURE WEST AS TO HOW, IF WEST REDUCED ONE-HALF OF ITS FORCES, IT WOULD NOT DIMINISH ITS SECURITY. WESTERN

PGOPOSALS WERE TOTALLY VOID OF CONTENT. ALLIED REPS CLAIMED THE WESTERN COUNTRIES WERE STUDYING THE EASTERN NON-INCREASE PROPOSAL. BUT ALLIED REPS WERE APPEARING TO REJECT THIS PROPOSAL WITH THE QUESTIONS THEY HAD ADVANCED ON THIS OCCASION. WAS THAT THEIR REAL INTENTION? UK REP SAID ALLIES WERE NOT IN A POSITION AT THIS POINT TO ADD ANYTHING FURTHER.

37. CZECHOSLOVAK REP SAID THAT ALLIED REPS HAD JUST REFERRED TO THEIR READINESS UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS TO LIMIT AIR FORCE PERSONNEL. EASTERN REPS HAD CAREFULLY STUDIED THIS PROPOSAL. IT INDICATED THAT THE WESTERN COUNTRIES WERE REFUSING AS THEY HAD HERETOFORE, TO REDUCE AIR FORCES. THIS POSITION CONFLICTED WITH THE AGREED SUBJECT MATTER OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH WAS THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS. THE NAVY WAS THE ONLY AGREED EXCEPTION, THEREFORE EVERYTHING ELSE WAS IN. HE DID NOT AGREE WITH UK REP'S INTERPREATION ON THIS POINT, BECAUSE DURING THE PRELIMINARY TALKS PARTICIPANTS HAD SAID THAT THE NAVY WAS OUT. THEY HAD NOT MADE ANY OTHER EXCEPTIONS. THIS MEANT THE AIR FORCE WAS IN. MOREOVER, IN THEIR PROPOSAL ALLIED REPS HAD SPOKEN ONLY OF LIMITING AIR FORCE MANPOWER. THIS LEFT OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF THE BUILDING UP OF COMBAT EQUIPMENT. FURTHERMORE, THE WESTERN POSITION HAD BEEN LINKED TO THE PRECONDITION THAT THE EAST ACCEPT THE WESTERN REDUCTION PLAN. BUT WESTERN REPS KNEW THAT THIS
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PLAN WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO EAST. UK REP HAD SAID THAT WEST OPPOSED REDUCTION OF AIR FORCE BECAUSE THE WITHDRAWN SOVIET AIR FORCES MIGHT RETURN RAPIDLY.

38. UK SAID HIS POINT HAD BEEN A GENERAL ONE. HE HAD NOT MENTIONED THE SOVIET AIR FORCE. CZECHOSLOVAK REP SAID THAT, IN ANY EVENT, PARTICIPANTS WERE NOT DISCUSSING PHYSICAL POSSIBILITIES, BUT A JURIDICAL COMMITMENT. THAT IS WHY THE EAST SPOKE OF THE NEED TO REDUCE ALL FORCES IN THE AREA. EAST WAS SPEAKING OF REDUCTION. WESTERN REPS WERE TRYING TO EVADE THE NEED TO REDUCE. THE EAST WAS READY TO REDUCE AIR FORCES. EASTERN REPS CONSIDERED THIS AN ESSENTIAL PREREQUISITE FOR THE STRENGTHENING OF SECURITY IN EUROPE, BUT WESTERN STATES WERE TRYING TO EVADE THIS. MOREOVER, EASTERN REPS WANTED TO KNOW WHY WESTERN STATES CONSTANTLY REFUSED TO REDUCE UNITS EQUIPPED WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IT WAS HARD FOR EAST TO UNDERSTAND WEST'S CONTENTION THAT REDUCTION OF THESE ENORMOUSLY DESTRUCTIVE WEAPONS WOULD NOT ALTER THE REALITIES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. IF ONE TOOK THIS POSITION SERIOUSLY, WHAT WOULD BE THE USE OF LONG SERIES OF EFFORTS BY VARIOUS STATES IN TRYING TO PREVENT THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS? ALL ASPECTS OF THE FORCES IN THE AREA MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IF PARTICIPANTS WISHED TO REACH A JUST AND

LASTING SOLUTION OF THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS. MOREOVER, THE WESTERN PROPOSAL SUGGESTED THAT THERE SHOULD BE AN OVERALL COMMON CEILING ON AIR FORCE PERSONNEL. BUT WESTERN REPS WERE AWARE OF THE EASTERN POSITION THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO HAVE A NATIONAL CEILING ON THIS TYPE OF FORCES ALSO.

39. U.S. REP ASKED KHLESTOV WHETHER LATTER DISAGREED THAT AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA WAS ABOUT THE SAME ON BOTH SIDES. KHLESTOV SAID THAT HE SHARED CZECHOSLOVAK REP'S OBJECTION TO THE WESTERN PROPOSAL FOR LIMITING AIR FORCE MANPOWER FOR THE SAME REASON, BECAUSE IT WAS AN EFFORT TO PROMULGATE COMMON AND COLLECTIVE CEILINGS. US REP ASKED ONCE MORE WHETHER KHLESTOV AGREED THAT AIR MANPOWER WAS ABOUT THE SAME ON BOTH SIDES.

40. KHLESTOV SAID EASTERN REPS BELIEVED IN TAKING ALL ELEMENTS OF THE ARMED FORCES INTO ACCOUNT, NOT ONLY MANPOWER. IF ONE CONSIDERED BOTH ALLIANCES TOGETHER, ALL ELEMENTS OF MILITARY
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POWER DETERMINED THE STRENGTH OF EACH ALLIANCE. AS FAR AS INDIVIDUAL LIMITS WERE CONCERNED, ONE SIDE MIGHT HAVE MORE OF ONE THING AND A SECOND SIDE MORE OF ANOTHER. ONE MIGHT HAVE MORE TANKS, AND ONE MIGHT HAVE MORE ANTI-TANK WEAPONS. BUT THE IMPORTANT THING IN ESTIMATING THE POWER OF MILITARY ALLIANCES WAS THAT ONE SHOULD
BASE IT ON THE ENTIRE FORCE INVOLVED ON BOTH SIDES. U.S. REP SAID HE ASSUMED KHLESTOV WAS NOT SUGGESTING THAT PARTICIPANTS WOULD DO THIS WITHOUT KNOWING THE SIZE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT CONSTITUENT ELEMENTS, AIR FORCES. KHLESTOV SAID THE ONLY REALISTIC APPROACH WAS THE OVERALL VIEW WHICH TOOK INTO ACCOUNT ALL ELEMENTS OF MILITARY STRENGTH. THIS WAS THE APPROACH THAT HAD BEEN REPEATEDLY TAKEN BY WESTERN LEADERS, INCLUDING MR. SCHLESINGER, MR. LEBER AND MR. HEATH. WHEN THEY SPOKE OF THE NEAR PARITY OF MILITARY POWER IN THE AREA AS THEY HAD, THEY CLEARLY HAD IN MIND THE OVERALL STRENGTH OF THE FORCES ON BOTH SIDES.

41. NETHERLANDS REP SAID THAT EASTERN FREEZE ONLY CONCERNED MANPOWER. HE REMINDED KHLESTOV THAT UK REP HAD ASKED HOW EASTERN REPS THEMSELVES SAW A SITUATION WHERE PARTICIPANTS DISAGREED ON THE FIGURES.

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AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

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FROM US REP MBFR

HOW, IN THIS SITUATION, COULD THE PARTICIPANTS HAVE A SUFFICIENT BASIS OF CONFIDENCE TO GO INTO SUCH AN AGREEMENT? KHLESTOV SAID HE HAD ALREADY EXPLAINED THAT THERE WAS A SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR AGREEMENT. NETHERLANDS REP SAID THAT WHAT EXISTED WAS NOT A BASIS FOR AGREEMENT, BUT A BASIS FOR DISAGREEMENT. KHLESTOV SAID HE HAD ADVANCED OTHER ARGUMENTS WHICH HE WOULD NOT NEED TO REPEAT AT THIS MOMENT.

42. SMIRNOVSKY SAID HE WISHED TO REPEAT JUST ONE POINT. A FEW WEEKS AGO, ALLIED REPS HAD THEMSELVES SAID THAT, ACCORDING TO THE LATEST NATO REVIEW OF DATA, THIS REVIEW HAD SHOWN THAT THE MANPOWER OF THE GROUND FORCES OF THE TWO ALLIANCES HAD INCREASED, NOT BY A LARGE DIFFERENCE BUT BY APPROXIMATELY EQUAL NUMBERS. WAS THIS STATEMENT MADE ON THE BASIS OF SOME DATA, OR WHAT ELSE WAS ITS BASIS? FROM THE EASTERN VIEWPOINT, ALLIED REPS HAD INDICATED THAT
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THEY KNEW WHAT WAS GOING ON IN THE AREA AND THAT THEY HAD THE CAPACITY TO CHECK THIS. NETHERLANDS REP SAID THE ALLIES

WERE NOT CLAIMING INCREASES BUT HAD USED MORE REFINED METHODS OF COMPUTATION. MOREOVER THEY HAD POINTED OUT THAT IT WAS A MINOR CHANGE AND NOT ONE OF BASIC RELATIONSHIPS. PARTICIPANTS HAD STATED THAT THEY WERE STILL FACED BY BASIC SITUATION OF DISAGREEMENT ON THE FACTS. PARTICIPANTS NEEDED AT LEAST SOME COMMON UNDERSTANDING ON THE BASIC FACTS. HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHY EAST WAS OBJECTING AGAINST GIVING SOME INDICATION OF THEIR OWN ESTIMATES IN THIS CONTEXT.

43. CZECHOSLOVAK REP SAID THAT, IN HIS RECENT PLENARY STATEMENT, HE HAD SPOKEN OF THE UN RESOLUTION RELATING TO NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY. THIS HAD BEEN A GOOD WILL GESTURE AND NOT A COMMITMENT. BUT NEVERTHELESS IT WAS A HISTORICAL FACT THAT NO ONE HAD VIOLATED IT. WHEN IT WAS FORMULATED, NO ONE HAD ASKED FOR AN EXACT COUNT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND WHO HAD THEM. THIS HAD BEEN A GOOD WILL ISSUE, LIKE THE PRESENT EASTERN PROPOSAL.

44. UK REP SAID THAT, IF THE PURPOSE OF THE PROPOSED NON-INCREASE AGREEMENT WAS TO CREATE GOOD WILL, HOW COULD PARTICIPANTS RELY ON PREVIOUSLY EXISTING GOOD WILL FOR THE BASIS OF THAT AGREEMENT? KHLESTOV SAID HE WAS SURE ALL PARTICIPANTS WOULD BELIEVE THAT EACH WOULD HONOR SUCH AN OBLIGATION. UK REP REPEATED THAT THIS WAS NOT A SOUND BASIS FOR AN AGREEMENT. KHLESTOV SAID THAT THERE WAS A LONG STANDING INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE, GOING BACK TO THE TIMES OF ANCIENT EGYPT, THAT ONCE THERE WAS A LACK OF GOOD WILL, NO MATTER HOW PRECISE THE AGREEMENT, IT WOULD NOT BE HONORED. TAKE THE VERSAILLES TREATY. THAT HAD BEEN CLEAR CUT AND SPECIFIC. BUT WHAT MATTERED WAS THE WILL OF PARTICIPANTS TO HONOR OBLIGATIONS ENTERED INTO. IF THERE WAS A NON-INCREASE OBLIGATION WITH A SHORT TIME LIMIT, IT WAS THE EASTERN ASSUMPTION THAT NO ONE WOULD WISH TO VIOLATE THE OBLIGATION BOTH FOR POLITICAL AND PRACTICAL REASONS. IF A GOVERNMENT HAD UNDERTAKEN SUCH AN OBLIGATION AND CONTINUED TO NEGOTIATE ON REDUCTIONS, NO GOVERNMENT COULD BE EXPECTED TO DO SUCH AN IMPRACTICAL THING AS INCREASE ITS FORCES UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES.

45. UK REP SAID HE STILL DID NOT UNDERSTAND HOW IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO HAVE A PRECISE AGREEMENT WITHOUT AGREEMENT
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ON THE FACTS TO WHICH IT RELATED.

46. SMIRNOVSKY SAID NATO COUNTRIES HAD EARLIER THEMSELVES PROPOSED A FREEZE WITHOUT REQUIRING KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACTS.

47. US REP SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THE SESSION WAS COMING TO AN END AND
WOULD LIKE TO TURN TO AN ISSUE OF SOME CONCERN TO ALLIED REPS.
DRAWING ON TALKING POINTS APPROVED BY THE AD HOC GROUP,

US REP CONTINUED THAT, IN THE COURSE OF THE PRESENT ROUND, A BASIC NEW ISSUE HAD EMERGED. THIS WAS THE ISSUE OF WHETHER PARTICIPANTS SHOULD DIRECTLY PURSUE THE AGREED GOALS OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS, OR WHETHER THEY SHOULD DEFER NEGOTIATIONS ON THESE GOALS AND INSTEAD SEEK OTHER, LIMITED OBJECTIVES. THE PROPOSALS EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAD INTRODUCED DURING THE CURRENT ROUND APPEARED TO THE WESTERN REPS TO GO IN THE DIRECTION OF LIMITED, INTERIM MEASURES NOT RESULTING IN CONCRETE IMPROVEMENTS IN THE PRESENT SECURITY SITUATION. THEY APPEARED AIMED AT PERPETUATING THAT SITUATION, A SITUATION WHICH, FOR THE MANY REASONS THE ALLIES HAD GIVEN, THE WEST REGARDED AS UNSATISFACTORY AND WHICH PARTICIPANTS SHOULD SEEK TO CHANGE.

48. US RP SAID THAT THE WEST'S POSITION WAS CLEAR. THE ALLIES BELIEVED IT WAS THE BUSINESS OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS TO AGREE ON SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS RESULTING IN A REAL ENHANCEMENT OF STABILITY AND REAL CONTRIBUTION TO STRENGTHENED PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE. THE ALLIES BELIEVED BOTH SIDES SHOULD CONTINUE TO MOVE DIRECTLY TOWARD THIS OBJECTIVE, WITHOUT DEVIATING FROM IT.

49. US REP POINTED OUT THAT THE OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS WHICH THE WEST HAD PUT FORWARD AT THE OUTSET OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS HAD LAID OUT A WORKABLE FRAMEWORK FOR ACHIEVING THIS OBJECTIVE. HOWEVER, THE EAST HAD CRITICIZED THIS FRAMEWORK AND HAD SAID THAT IT DID NOT MEET EASTERN CONCERNS IN A NUMBER OF RESPECTS. THEREFORE, TO FACILITATE MORE PRODUCTIVE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE SUBJECT OF REDUCTIONS, THE ALLIES HAD MODIFIED
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THEIR FRAMEWORK IN A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT RESPECTS. THE WEST HAD CONTINUED THIS PROCESS DURING THE PRESENT ROUND, AND HAD INTRODUCED A NUMBER OF NEW PROPOSALS. THESE NEW PROPOSALS, TAKEN TOGETHER WITH THE WESTERN PROPOSALS MADE IN PREVIOUS ROUNDS, RESULTED IN A PRACTICAL FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH THE ALLIES BELIEVED PARTICIPANTS SHOULD NOW BE ABLE TO PROCEED TO PRODUCTIVE NEGOTIATION ON ACTUAL REDUCTIONS.

50. US REP CONTINUED THAT, FOR EXAMPLE, ON THE ISSUE OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET, THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD NOW PRESENTED A FULLY DEVELOPED MIDDLE-GROUND POSITION. WITH THE ADDITION OF THE POINTS THEY HAD MADE DURING THIS ROUND, THE ALLIES HAD SERIOUSLY ADDRESSED THE CONCERNS EXPRESSED

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AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY

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FROM US REP MBFR

BY EASTERN REPS ABOUT THE WESTERN APPROACH TO PHASING.
THERE NOW EXISTED AN OBJECTIVE BASIS FOR EASTERN REPS
TO SATISFY THEMSELVES THAT THERE WOULD BE A SECOND
PHASE INCLUDING REDUCTIONS BY ALL REMAINING WESTERN
DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, EXCEPT LUXEMBOURG.

51. US REP SAID THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT STEP THE
ALLIES HAD TAKEN DURING THIS ROUND WAS THEIR PROPOSAL
TO EXTEND COVERAGE IN CONNECTION WITH POSSIBLE AGREE-
MENTS TO ALL MILITARY MANPOWER IN THE AREA, EXCEPT
OF COURSE FOR THE AGREED EXCEPTION OF THE NAVY. THE
WEST REMAINED OPPOSED TO REDUCTION OF AIR FORCES. BUT
THE ALLIES NOW HAD DECIDED, IN ORDER TO FACILITATE
PROGRESS IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS, AND IN ORDER TO MEET
CERTAIN CONCERNS WHICH EASTERN REPS HAD EXPRESSED,
TO CONSIDER OTHER WAYS OF LIMITING AIR FORCE MANPOWER
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IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS IN CONNECTION WITH AN AGREE-
MENT TO REACH PARITY IN GROUND FORCES. SPECIFICALLY,
THE WEST HAD PROPOSED THAT PARTICIPANTS CONSIDER A
MUTUAL NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT ON OVERALL AIR FORCE
MANPOWER IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS FOR THE PERIOD
BETWEEN THE PHASES AND THAT THIS LIMITATION COULD BE
CARRIED OVER TO THE SECOND PHASE IN SOME FORM. THIS
PROPOSAL WAS A STEP OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE. IT REPRESENTED
A FUNDAMENTAL, SUBSTANTIVE CHANGE IN THE ORIGINAL WESTERN
APPROACH THAT THESE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD DEAL EXCLUSIVELY WITH
GROUND FORCES. THE ALLIES NOW WERE WILLING TO COVER AIR
FORCES, IN THE MANNER WHICH THEY HAD PROPOSED, UNDER
POSSIBLE AGREEMENTS. THE WEST CONTINUED TO HOPE THAT
EASTERN REPS WOULD AGREE THAT THIS WAS THE APPROPRIATE
WAY OF DEALING WITH THE QUESTION OF AIR FORCES IN THESE
NEGOTIATIONS AND THAT PARTICIPANTS COULD NOW TURN TO
CONCRETE NEGOTIATION ON THE REDUCTION OF GROUND FORCES. THIS
MEANT TOO THAT ALL WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WERE PREPARED,
IN CONNECTION WITH A SATISFACTORY FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT,
TO UNDERTAKE SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS WITH REGARD TO ALL ALLIED
FORCES IN THE AREA, EXCEPT FOR THE NAVY.

52. US REP SAID THAT THESE STEPS WHICH HE HAD DESCRIBED
TODAY, TOGETHER WITH THE STEPS THE WEST HAD TAKEN IN THE
PREVIOUS ROUNDS, PROVIDED A PRACTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THESE
NEGOTIATIONS, A FRAMEWORK THAT DEALT WITH THE MAJOR CONCERNS
EXPRESSED BY EASTERN REPS ABOUT THE ORIGINAL WESTERN
APPROACH. THIS FRAMEWORK SHOULD ENABLE THE
PARTICIPANTS TO CONCENTRATE ON THE MAIN TASK IN VIENNA --
NEGOTIATING REDUCTIONS WHICH WERE BOTH SUBSTANTIAL AND WHICH
RESULTED IN A REAL ENHANCEMENT OF STABILITY AND SECURITY.
SO THE ALLIES HOPED THE EAST WOULD GIVE CAREFUL CONSIDERATION
TO THE FRAMEWORK THE WESTERN SIDE HAD PROPOSED FOR SEEKING
AGREEMENT ON REDUCTIONS, AND THAT, USING THIS FRAMEWORK, EASTERN
REPS WOULD BE PREPARED TO JOIN THE WEST IN MAKING PRACTICAL
PROGRESS TOWARD AGREEMENT ON MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT
REDUCTIONS DURING THE NEXT ROUND.

53. KHLESTOV SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE A FEW COMMENTS ON US
REP'S REMARKS. THAT US REP HAD AGAIN PRESENTED ARGUMENTS TO
DEFEND THE OVERALL WESTERN POSITION WAS CLEAR AND NOT

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SURPRISING, EVEN THOUGH POLISH REP HAD SHOWN IN DETAIL THE
SHORTCOMINGS OF THE WESTERN OUTLINE PROPOSAL. STRULAK HAD

ALSO DESCRIBED IN DETAIL THE EASTERN REDUCTION PROGRAM OF NOVEMBER 8, 1973. ALLIED REPS HAD THEREFORE A CLEAR STATEMENT OF THE EASTERN POSITION AND ALSO OF EASTERN VIEWS ON THE WESTERN PLAN. POLISH REP HAD INDICATED THE ADVANTAGES OF EASTERN PLAN, WHICH WAS AN OBJECTIVE BASIS FOR A SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION FOR SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS. EASTERN REPS URGED WESTERN REPS TO CONTINUE TO STUDY THAT PROPOSAL IN A MORE FAVORABLE WAY, SO THAT PARTICIPANTS COULD SUCCEED AND FIND A SPEEDY SOLUTION WITH PARTICIPATION OF ALL ELEVEN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS.

54. KHESTOV SAID HE HAD BEEN SURPRISED BY US REP'S REMARKS THAT ALLIED REPS WERE CONCERNED OVER THE ISSUE OF WHETHER PARTICIPANTS WERE ENGAGED IN THE SEARCH FOR SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS OR LOOKING FOR AN INTERIM SOLUTION WHICH WOULD NOT RESULT IN A SOLUTION OF THE MAIN TASK OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. US REP HAD CITED THE LAST EASTERN PROPOSAL AS LEADING TO THIS CONCLUSION. THIS CONCLUSION WAS THE CAUSE OF SURPRISE TO EASTERN REPS BECAUSE IT WAS IN CONTRADICTION TO THE EVALUATION OF EASTERN PROPOSALS WHICH WESTERN REPS HAD THEMSELVES MADE EARLIER. IT WAS CLEAR THAT THESE TWO EASTERN PROPOSALS WERE IN FULL CONFORMITY WITH THE DESIRE TO FIND AN INTERIM REDUCTION STEP TO THE NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH HAVE GONE ON A FULL YEAR WITHOUT PROGRESS. THE POSITIVE EFFECT AND VALUE OF SUCH A PROPOSAL IS INDISPUTABLE. WESTERN REPS HAD ADMITTED THIS IN THEIR OWN STATEMENT. THEY HAD ADMITTED THAT THE EAST'S INITIAL REDUCTION STEP PROPOSAL CONTAINED SOME POSITIVE ELEMENTS. AND ON THE PRESENT OCCASION, ALLIED REPS HAD STATED THAT THEY WERE CAREFULLY STUDYING THE LATEST EASTERN PROPOSAL FOR A NON-INCREASE AGREEMENT. EVEN FROM THESE PREVIOUS REMARKS, IT FOLLOWED THAT THESE PROPOSALS WERE NOT CONSIDERED TO DEVIATE FROM THE GOALS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, BUT WERE DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE THEM. THIS WAS THE WESTERN EVALUATION OF THESE PROPOSALS. AS FAR AS THE EAST WAS CONCERNED, EASTERN REPS KNEW THAT THESE PROPOSALS HAD BEEN AIMED AT FINDING SOLUTIONS DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE THE GOALS SET FORTH IN THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE OF THE PRELIMINARY TALKS.

55. KHESTOV SAID ATTEMPTS ON THE WESTERN SIDE TO CLAIM THAT THE EASTERN PROPOSAL FOR AN INITIAL REDUCTION STEP CONFLICTED WITH
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THE AGREED GOALS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE NOT VALID BECAUSE THEY WERE AT VARIANCE WITH THE DOCUMENTS WHICH ESTABLISHED THE PROCEDURE AND AGREED PRINCIPLES. SUCH A POSITION WAS HARMFUL FOR A MUTUAL SEARCH FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS, BECAUSE IT CALLS INTO QUESTION POSSIBLE VALUE OF PROPOSALS DESIGNED TO SOLVE THE COMPLEX PROBLEMS BEFORE THE PARTICIPANTS. IT WAS THEREFORE CLEAR THAT PROPOSALS AIMED AT SOLVING MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS COULD INCLUDE AN INITIAL REDUCTION STEP. THE CONCERN

EXPRESSED BY US REP COULD NOT

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CONTRIBUTE TO A SEARCH FOR A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION. EASTERN REPS WOULD ONLY WELCOME IT IF WESTERN REPS HAD SUBMITTED THEIR OWN PROPOSALS OF THIS TYPE, BUT THEY HAD NOT. ALTHOUGH US REP ADVANCED THE IDEA THAT THE WESTERN OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS PROVIDED A PRACTICAL FRAMEWORK, EASTERN REPS HAD JUST DEMONSTRATED ITS DRAWBACKS ONCE AGAIN. THEY CONSIDERED IT AT VARIANCE WITH THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. THEREFORE HE PROPOSED THAT ALONG WITH CONTINUED STUDY OF THE ORIGINAL EASTERN REDUCTION PLAN, ALLIED REPS SHOULD CONTINUE TO STUDY THE RECENT EASTERN PROPOSALS. AFTER CAREFUL STUDY THEY WOULD DETECT POSITIVE ELEMENTS IN THE EASTERN PROPOSAL FOR AN INITIAL REDUCTION STEP IN 1975, AND IN THE EASTERN PROPOSAL FOR A NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT FOR THE DURATION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. ALL THESE PROPOSALS HAD ONE COMMON GOAL -- TO SEEK SOLUTION OF

MUTUAL REDUCTIONS OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE,
WHICH WAS THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

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56. POLISH REP SAID PARTICIPANTS HAD HAD AN EXTENSIVE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS IN THIS MEETING COVERING BOTH PROPOSALS PUT FORWARD IN THIS ROUND, AS WELL AS THE GENERAL POSITIONS OF BOTH SIDES. SOVIET REP HAD CHARACTERIZED THE SITUATION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE WOULD ADD THAT THERE WAS ONE ANNOYING ELEMENT IN US REP'S ASSESSMENT. THAT WAS THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE WEST CONTINUES TO BE DISCUSSING THE SUBJECT NOT ONLY IN GLOBAL TERMS BUT MAINLY ON THE BASIS OF THE APPROACH SUGGESTED IN THE WESTERN OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS SUBMITTED LAST NOVEMBER 1973.

THERE WAS MORE THAN ONE WAY TO ACHIEVE AGREEMENT IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS. THE WESTERN POSITION CONTAINED SOME ELEMENTS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AS THE EAST PERCEIVED THEM. EASTERN REPS THOUGHT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD TRY FOR SOME LESS GENERAL APPROACH FOR THE SAKE OF SOME PRACTICAL MOVE AND CREATE CONFIDENCE FOR FUTURE. BOTH SIDES HAD SPOKEN OF THE NEED TO ACHIEVE PROGRESS. FOR THE EASTERN REPS THE MOST IMPORTANT THING WAS THAT THE WEST SHOULD BACK THIS DESIRE WITH CONCRETE ACTIONS. THE EAST HAD MOVED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ELEMENTS OF THE WESTERN POSITION. THE WEST HAD NOT DONE THE SAME THING WITH REGARD TO THE EAST. AT LEAST ON THE MAIN QUESTION ON WHICH ATTENTION HAD BEEN CONCENTRATED, WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET, IT WOULD NOT BE ACCURATE TO SAY THAT THE WEST HAD PROPOSED ANY COMPARABLE SOLUTION TO THOSE PROPOSED BY THE EAST. THE HARD FACT HAD BEEN CONFIRMED DURING THE PRESENT DISCUSSION ON NATIONAL CEILINGS, THAT CANADIAN AND THE WESTERN EUROPEANS CONTINUED TO REFUSE TO SAY HOW MUCH AND WHEN THEY WOULD REDUCE, AND WERE CONTINUING TO MAKE THEIR REDUCTION DEPENDENT ON SOME PRIOR CONDITIONS. IF THESE COUNTRIES WERE WILLING TO SHOW IN CONCRETE TERMS THEIR WILLINGNESS TO REDUCE, THIS WOULD BE HELPFUL. THE EAST FOR ITS PART HAD MADE AN EFFORT TO ACHIEVE MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS ON THIS ISSUE. IF EASTERN GOOD WILL AND EASTERN EFFORTS WERE RECIPROCATED, THE NEGOTIATIONS COULD MAKE PROGRESS. WHAT EASTERN REPS HAD HEARD ON THE PRESENT OCCASION DID NOT CHANGE THEIR GENERAL PERCEPTION OF THE WESTERN POSITION. BUT NOW PARTICIPANTS HAD TIME FOR REFLECTION. HE ASKED THE WESTERN COLLEAGUES TO SERIOUSLY THINK HOW THEY TOO COULD DEMONSTRATE THEIR WILLINGNESS TO REACH MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS IN ORDER TO MAKE PROGRESS IN THE NEXT ROUND.

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Message Attributes

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